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Abstract 
This paper describes the further continuation of an 
investigation to identify and develop tools for the 
identification and management of hazards likely to arise with 
the quality and behavioural aspects in and resulting from 
automatic advice – such as might arise with an automated 
system advisory function facilitating critical decision-making 
with an autonomous vehicle.  An example of a representative 
critical advisory function is identified in that supporting a 
necessary “Sense & Avoid” capability, as embodied within an 
airborne autonomous system.  In consideration then of how 
might a model driven approach, combining physical and 
dynamical models, statistical data and belief be combined to 
aid system evaluation,  work has so far been undertaken to 
investigate the nature of suitable models to provide 
representations of the control structure and system dynamics.  
Whilst the system engineering methods are to be generic, the 
context of “Sense & Avoid” provides a relevant framework 
within which to pose a “toy-problem” with complex 
behaviour, against which to judge the methods and models. 
1 Introduction 
In the first instance representations of dynamical models have 
been developed in the context of an outline exemplar 
describing an air-proximity hazard arising between two air-
vehicles; a model of sufficient fidelity so as to capture a 
representation of the complexity and emergent behaviour that 
can arise with this interaction.  Furthermore, this study has 
been pursued to develop a broader Systems approach towards 
hazard assessment so as to evaluate hypothetical deviations 
from declared intent – wherein a behavioural modelling 
framework is to be styled upon that of a STAMP [9] (Systems 
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) based hazard 
assessment methodology and drawing upon STPA [15, 18].  It 
is proposed that one might combine the associated system 
models, undertake exploratory dynamic hazard assessment, 
and conduct this within the context of a Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA); as a possible extension to the 
process guidelines as described in Aerospace Recommended 
Practice (ARP) 4754A [3]; as outlined in Figure 1.  It is also 
suggested that this improved process model ought to facilitate 
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies from the system 
concept stage onwards, along with an inference approach 
indentifying likely design faults arising with dynamic 
hazards; effectively supporting the “diagnosis” of design 
faults during concept development, and then through iteration 
around this process loop, validate the plausibility of the 
particular suspected design faults and consistency with the 
Hazard model. 
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Figure 1: Considering a possible extension to the ARP 4754. 
 
Currently this model incorporates only the constraint of a 
minimum permitted horizontal separation of 500 ft at closest 
approach, and in the case of an Unmanned Air Vehicle 
(UAV) therefore embody a principal safety constraint that the 
UAV must be capable of manoeuvring (autonomously), as 
required, to satisfy this minimum safe separation requirement. 
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Figure 2: An Extended HAZOP Table including Phase of 
Flight and distinguishing between protective System 
Actions (Safety Constraints) and Defensive Barriers (in 
the system Design Decisions). 
 
Any higher-level constraint model is to be layered upon the 
current physical-layer model, and developed into appropriate 
representational system models in SysML.   
1.1 The challenge for Functional Hazard Assessment 
It should be noted that within the aerospace field, wherever an 
operator or other human agency is essential to the safe 
operation of an air system, then Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) studies are already recommended practice; 
especially in the case of Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations 
[2].  However, ARP 4754/4761 [1, 3] make no mention of 
HAZOP, as these guidelines are concerned with the 
development of aircraft systems; where in fact the 
configuration and distributed nature of Unmanned Air 
Systems (UAS) tend to blur the boundaries in the roles and 
autonomy of the airborne avionics and control systems, the 
software, data-links and hardware in Ground Control Stations 
(GCS), and the Designated UAV Operator (DUO), ATC, etc., 
and indeed potentially also in the expected interaction 
behaviour of any other airspace users (manned or unmanned). 
 
Consequently, the approach taken with regard to a 
preliminary system safety assessment, as defined in ARP 
4754 [3], refers to the list of acceptable methods to be found 
in ARP 4761 [1], which in turn describes Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Dependence Diagrams (DD), and Markov Analysis 
(MA) as appropriate methods.  Both FTA and DD are 
examples of what Leveson describes as “chain-of-event” 
models of accident causation [9], and posits that these types 
of models “... cannot account for indirect and nonlinear 
relationships”.  Leveson describes that the systems of interest, 
in accident causation, are typically Open Systems, and 
maintained in a state of dynamic equilibrium through closed 
loop control and feedback.  Therefore, in this world-view 
neither can MA provide sufficient completeness in the 
prediction of accident causation, as these models are 
representative of Closed Systems wherein equilibrium is 
treated as a synonym for Invariant or Stationary; i.e. when the 
probability of a subsequent system state is identical to that of 
the preceding state.  Furthermore, each of these methods also 
relies upon knowing or estimating a specific probabilistic 
value assigned to any individual failure or state.  For a while 
now, it has been suggested by Wilkinson and Kelly [19] that a 
more pro-active approach should be adopted in the 
identification of potential hazards than provided for in the 
process of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA); as specified 
by ARP 4754/4761.  In particular where complexity and 
issues of integration with other system apply it is proposed 
that, rather than the production of hazard checklists and 
analysis through a “chain-of-event” model, a process akin to 
HAZOP ought to be applied [19] with consideration of the 
effects of “deviations” from intended function or behaviour.  
More recently, in the case of Systems of Systems, Porter, et al 
[16], suggest that special attention ought to be given to the 
integration issues manifest in networks of manned and 
unmanned systems (amongst others); with a need to consider 
the challenges of semi-automatic behaviour, functional 
allocation to operator and automation, complex non-linear 
interactions, and so on. 
2 Wherefore HAZOP? 
Figure 2 presents a form of HAZOP table as developed in 
earlier work within the ASTRAEA project, with the purpose 
of providing a list of hazards as top-events within the 
development of another phased-mission reliability analysis 
methodology [17] – therefore supporting an innovative but 
otherwise traditional “chain-of-events” failure model 
subsequently.  However, the HAZOP process itself was 
primary to this, with the development of a more open 
representation of the system and its intended behaviour as a 
UML model, and as usual conducted as a mental-process with 
Design Decision The UAV shall incorporate a Collision Avoidance System to prevent separations closer than 500ft horizontally, remaining "well clear" of other aircraft.
Principal Safety Constraint The UAV must manoeuvre to maintain a safe horizontal separation from other aircraft where appropriate.
Assumption The hazardous incident starts with the UAV in class G airspace operating in marginal Visual Meteorological Conditions and involves a light aircraft routing for the same Visual Reporting Point (VRP) oblivious of the conflicting track of the UAV entering controlled airspace (even if informed so by ATC), and flying at the same altitude.
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a group of experts reasoning about the likely effects of 
deviations in the described intended behaviours.  This hazard 
assessment process was explored through the application of a 
set of guidewords, and then using the UML model as the 
framework within which to describe the likely propagation of 
effects – with a view also to later development of a machine 
based reasoning support mechanism utilising these models. 
Hazard and Operability studies are used to consider every 
deviation of a process system from its design intent and are 
generally undertaken as a group mental process, involving 
manual construction and recording, and performed by a team 
of experts.  Overall, it is often a time consuming approach to 
hazard analysis, due to this manual construction.  The key to a 
successful HAZOP study lies in a greater part in the 
appropriate selection of suitable Guidewords, and suitable 
Parameters to which these guidewords might be applied, and 
so form a specific and narrowly defined set of Deviations.  
For example in this study the following Guidewords and 
Parameters have been applied (in part): 
 
Guidewords (used)  Guidewords (unused) 
NONE / NO / OMISSION  PART OF 
WRONG / COMMISION  OTHER THAN 
EARLY 
LATE 
LESS 
MORE 
CONFLICTING 
 
Parameters   Commands as parameter 
Data    Manoeuvre 
Direction 
Distance 
Speed 
Thrust 
 
The point of HAZOP studies is that it is not an attempt to 
calculate or quantify the likelihood of occurrence, but 
consider qualitatively what will happen in the case of a 
parameter, measure or quantity being outside of its normal 
operating range (a deviation).  Therefore the study considers 
every stage of a process and applies relevant guidewords to 
each stage; evaluating what the effect would be to the system 
and process should that guideword occur.  Hence the method 
considers a continuous process in steady state, and considers 
all potential deviations from the intended design. 
2.1 HAZOP as used in the aerospace sector 
In the case of aerodrome operators and air traffic service 
providers, HAZOP can be used as a systematic approach for 
identifying hazards in the operation of these services.  In this 
case the system representation would show the system as a set 
of Components, Interconnections, Entities (within the 
components or interconnections), and Attributes to which the 
Guidewords are to be applied.  It is advised that the number 
of participants should be limited to between five and seven 
people.  Such a team of experts would include a Study 
Leader, a Recorder, an Operation of System Expert, Users of 
the System, and other experts [2]. 
2.2 HAZOP as (semi)automated propagation method 
Computer based qualitative reasoning models supporting the 
HAZOP process have been developed, by in effect providing 
“HAZOP emulation” to the HAZOP team; for example as 
with STOPHAZ and HAZID codes [10-14].  These have been 
developed in the main for the chemical, process and power 
generation plant industries, and utilise libraries of components 
embodying qualitative propagation models with associated 
effects attached, supporting the construction of complex plant 
models derived from their Pipe & Instrumentation Diagrams 
(P&ID).  Using these software based tools and libraries the 
HAZOP team can discuss, reason and apply their expertise to 
the believed behaviour of individual components, some of 
which might be quite complex of themselves, with the 
software then capturing all of the permitted propagations of 
cause and effect between components; both down-stream and 
up-stream.  With the propagation methods of qualitative 
deviation and effect already addressed to a greater extent, at 
least for static behavioural models, further consideration 
might be given to the encapsulation and propagation 
behaviour of essentially dynamic systems.  Certainly the 
process plant models are treated as closed system, operating 
at particular set-points.  However, autonomous and mobile 
robotic systems cannot be safely treated as closed systems, 
due to their homeostatic goal seeking behaviour within a state 
of dynamic equilibrium. 
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Figure 3: Hazard Modelling with System Dynamics Model. 
 
To this end it is proposed that a hazard modelling and 
inference process be developed, as described in Figure 3.  In 
this process the actual HAZOP is to be styled upon the 
approach as adopted for STPA [15, 18], whilst an additional 
method is to be developed to cater for the iterative nature of 
hazard assessment with dynamical modelling supported by an 
inference mechanism connecting and validating the apparent 
dynamical behaviour with respect to the assessed causes. 
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The Employment of FMEA, FTA and FFA together constitutes 
FHA (Functional Hazard Analysis) as described in ARP 4761
 
Figure 4: Hazard Analysis – options for combining methods, 
a pseudo QFD ranking. 
3 Incorporating STAMP – STPA 
Considering the various features or “coverage” of the 
different hazard assessment methods, from “classification of 
severity effect” to “socio-technical behaviour” (Figure 4), a 
case might be made that taken together a HAZOP 
methodology and a STAMP framework [9] forms a combined 
methodology that complements the coverage of the 
approaches adopted by FHA; albeit somewhat subjectively. 
 
In adopting the STAMP framework, and in particular the 
“Systems Theoretic Process Analysis” (STPA) [15, 18], an 
approach can be developed that considers the likely nature of 
an applicable range of “Inadequate Control Actions” (ICA), 
effectively deviations, in the context of a simplified model of 
the Low-level Process Control Loop [18].   
3.1 STPA and the low-level process control loop 
Applying this approach then in the case of the work described 
here, certain simple extensions can prove useful.  For 
example, two further fundamental modifications to the 
generic process control loop have been added, as shown in 
Figure 5; both related to behavioural control and interactions 
relevant to mobile robotics and autonomous systems.  First, 
these types of systems generally do not produce outputs 
typical of a production or set-point control system.  Often the 
useful output arises in the context of interactions with other 
independently controlled entities.  Second, reactive robotic 
systems usually embody a layering of behavioural control 
strategies, each with different goals and priorities, and that 
these constitute the overall feedback control model for the 
robotic entity‟s interaction with its environment  [4].  To this 
end, Figure 5 includes additional places representing such 
layered behavioural models, the further inclusion of a “state 
information” model to represent the „perceptions‟ that the 
behavioural models will have of the state of the environment, 
and a representation of the coupling of the process output 
space with any other related entities to the right. 
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Figure 5: UAS Collision Avoidance Low-level Process 
Control Loop, styled on the generic STPA process [18]. 
 
Otherwise, the manner by which this representation is used to 
systematically identify hazards remains the same as for the 
described STPA process [18].  Start by identifying the 
controlled parameter (“manoeuvre” – in the case of the 
Collision Avoidance System) along with the applicable set of 
guidewords; for each deviation identify all likely design or 
“control flaws” (CFxx) associated with each of the relevant 
parts of the model by applying each deviation (ICAnn) whilst 
working around the loop (including any connecting 
components that might be assigned to other related entities); 
for each flaw then identify any additional safety constraint 
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(SCyy) as mitigation; and finally detail the associated design 
decisions (DDzz) required to implement or enforce these 
additional safety constraints.  Repeat the process around the 
control-loop until safety assurance is satisfied.  Additionally, 
annotate the HAZOP and models with these as shown below. 
4 Closing the Loop with Inference 
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Figure 6: HAZOP for potential Design and Control Flaw 
Diagnosis, and Cause Inference using Bayesian Network. 
 
The HAZOP process facilitates reasoning about the 
possibility and likelihood of hazardous consequences 
occurring due to deviations from design intent.  However, as 
it is generally conducted as a mental-process, or at best 
supported with software models for quasi-static cases, more is 
needed to support reasoning and validation with regard to 
complex dynamical outcomes.  For example an automated 
assessment of risk in the navigation of shipping using 
Bayesian Learning [8] has been demonstrated with networks 
wholly derived by learning from accident data.  However, 
with no a priori data available, and the problem then to 
reconcile any such learnt data structures with information 
derived from a HAZOP process, suggests that at least a part 
of such an inference model be derived from the structure of 
the HAZOP table itself; as in Figure 6.  Subsequently time-
series data from the system dynamics model may then be 
processed, indicating degrees of belief in the causes, 
facilitating closed-loop model-based assessment combining 
risk analysis and risk evaluation, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Closing the Loop with Time-series Inference – 
Validation and Verification. 
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Figure 8: Functional Models – System and Components. 
 
Finally, Guiochet, et al, [7] argue that HAZOP might also be 
facilitated with UML Use Cases and Sequence Diagrams as a 
more formal system requirements specification embodying 
some behavioural characteristics with which to reason about 
deviations.  Then to provide an interface model with similar 
formalism this unified modelling approach might be extended 
to include Parametric diagrams and Constraint Blocks from 
SysML (Figure 8) for the causal loop models as proposed in 
STAMP.  Each of these constructs might also represent the 
various types of element comprising an “Intent Specification” 
[15]; including the Environment, Supervisory / Operator 
Task, Functional, Validation & Verification (analysis) 
models, whilst introducing the concept of a representation for 
any anticipated specific system Dysfunction models also. 
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Figure 9: Incorporating HAZOP alongside ARP 4754A.. 
 
A proposal for a closed-loop safety assessment process, 
incorporating HAZOP styled upon STPA, system dynamics 
modelling, and Bayesian inference, is proposed as an 
approach to extend the PASA for a UAS/UAV; as shown in 
Figure 9.  This arises from an earlier provisional requirements 
analysis and a discussion of bottom-up model building [5, 6].  
To date, a dynamical model incorporating representative 
6 
behaviours has been created, with a selection of hazardous 
vignettes also identified and explored. The results from these 
behavioural interactions have been collated with the 
corresponding Bayesian inference results in the form of a 
questionnaire to be presented to appropriate system specialists 
in the next stage of this work.  This future validation by 
questionnaire is intended to reveal whether the same 
outcomes, as produced by the models, might be intuited 
directly by those with sufficient expertise, both in terms of the 
behavioural dynamics and the inferences made from these.  
Acknowledgements 
The authors wish to thank BAE SYSTEMS and EPSRC for 
supporting this project, operating through the Systems 
Engineering Doctorate Centre at Loughborough University. 
References 
[1] ARP 4761 - Guidelines and Methods for Conducting 
the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne 
Systems and Equipment. Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 
USA: Society of Automotive Engineers, SAE 
International, (1996). 
[2] CAP 760 - Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard 
Identification, Risk Assessment and the Production 
of Safety Cases. London, UK: TSO (The Stationery 
Office) on behalf of the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority, Air Traffic Standards Department, Safety 
Regulation Group, (2006). 
[3] ARP 4754A - Guidelines for Development of Civil 
Aircraft and Systems. Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 
USA: Society of Automotive Engineers, SAE 
Aerospace, SAE International Group, (2010). 
[4] R. A. Brooks, Cambrian Intelligence: The Early 
History of the New AI: Bradford Books, The MIT 
Press, (1999). 
[5] C. G. Downes, P. W. H. Chung, and A. Morris, 
"Hazards in advising autonomy: A structured 
approach seeking novelty in developing the 
requirements for an exemplar," in System of Systems 
Engineering (SoSE), 2010 5th International 
Conference on, (2010), pp. 1-7. 
[6] C. G. Downes and P. W. H. Chung, "Hazards in 
advising autonomy: Developing requirements for a 
hazard modelling methodology incorporating system 
dynamics," in Dependable Control of Discrete 
Systems (DCDS), 2011 3rd International Workshop 
on, (2011), pp. 115-120. 
[7] J. Guiochet, D. Martin-Guillerez, and D. Powell, 
"Experience with Model-Based User-Centered Risk 
Assessment for Service Robots," in High-Assurance 
Systems Engineering (HASE), 2010 IEEE 12th 
International Symposium on, (2010), pp. 104-113. 
[8] S. Hu, C. Cai, and Q. Fang, "Risk assessment of ship 
navigation using Bayesian learning," in Industrial 
Engineering and Engineering Management, 2007 
IEEE International Conference on, (2007), pp. 1878-
1882. 
[9] N. G. Leveson, "A systems-theoretic approach to 
safety in software-intensive systems," Dependable 
and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 
1, pp. 66-86, (2004). 
[10] S. A. McCoy, S. J. Wakeman, F. D. Larkin, P. W. H. 
Chung, A. G. Rushton, and F. P. Lees, "HAZID, A 
Computer Aid for Hazard Identification: 2. Unit 
Model System," Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, vol. 77, pp. 328-334, (1999). 
[11] S. A. McCoy, S. J. Wakeman, F. D. Larkin, P. W. H. 
Chung, A. G. Rushton, F. P. Lees, and P. M. Heino, 
"HAZID, A Computer Aid for Hazard Identification: 
3. The Fluid Model and Consequence Evaluation 
Systems," Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, vol. 77, pp. 335-353, (1999). 
[12] S. A. McCoy, S. J. Wakeman, F. D. Larkin, M. L. 
Jefferson, P. W. H. Chung, A. G. Rushton, F. P. 
Lees, and P. M. Heino, "HAZID, A Computer Aid 
for Hazard Identification: 1. The Stophaz Package 
and the Hazid Code: An Overview, the Issues and 
the Structure," Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, vol. 77, pp. 317-327, (1999). 
[13] S. A. McCoy, S. J. Wakeman, F. D. Larkin, P. W. H. 
Chung, A. G. Rushton, and F. P. Lees, "Hazid, A 
Computer Aid for Hazard Identification: 4. Learning 
Set, Main Study System, Output Quality and 
Validation Trials," Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, vol. 78, pp. 91-119, 
(2000). 
[14] S. A. McCoy, S. J. Wakeman, F. D. Larkin, P. W. H. 
Chung, A. G. Rushton, and F. P. Lees, "Hazid, a 
Computer Aid for Hazard Identification: 5. Future 
Development Topics and Conclusions," Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection, vol. 78, pp. 
120-142, (2000). 
[15] B. D. Owens, M. S. Herring, N. Dulac, N. G. 
Leveson, M. D. Ingham, and K. A. Weiss, 
"Application of a Safety-Driven Design 
Methodology to an Outer Planet Exploration 
Mission," in Aerospace Conference, 2008 IEEE, 
(2008), pp. 1-24. 
[16] J. Porter, M. Squair, and A. Singh, "Risk & Safety 
Aspects of Systems of Systems," 44th AIAA 
Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit; Reno, NV; 
USA; 9-12 Jan, pp. 1-15, (2006). 
[17] R. Remenyte-Prescott, J. D. Andrews, and P. W. H. 
Chung, "An efficient phased mission reliability 
analysis for autonomous vehicles," RELIABILITY 
ENGINEERING & SYSTEM SAFETY, vol. 95, pp. 
226-235, (2009). 
[18] M. V. Stringfellow, N. G. Leveson, and B. D. 
Owens, "Safety-Driven Design for Software-
Intensive Aerospace and Automotive Systems," 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 98, pp. 515-525, 
(2010). 
[19] P. J. Wilkinson and T. P. Kelly, "Functional hazard 
analysis for highly integrated aerospace systems," in 
Certification of Ground/Air Systems Seminar (Ref. 
No. 1998/255), IEE, (1998), pp. 4/1-4/6. 
